We’ve reached Part III. Yes, I’m behind schedule. Horror of horrors, Liverpool will have already played a Premier League match (6:30 a.m. CDT tomorrow at Fulham – Up the Mighty Reds!) before I manage to publish my Season Preview.
Well, cut me a break. It’s a long season. To the extent the Season Preview would have been insightful if I had published it today, it will be equally insightful (or not) when I publish it some time next week.
But, before we get to the team breakdown and the Season Preview, I wanted to spend a bit of time talking about football tactics, including formations, positional roles, and styles of play. Hopefully this Part will give you newbies some new vocabulary and – to some extent – a new mindset that may make watching the game more interesting. Finally, because I often refer in my football writing to a few advanced statistics – most notably expected goals (xG) – here in Part III I will give you a brief overview of what those stats mean.
Let’s dive right in.
What’s a Formation?
Often, you might hear TV football announcers casually refer to a team playing in a “4-3-3 system today,” or that, following a substitution, the manager has “shifted to a 4-2-3-1,” etc. These numbers may seem nonsensical, but they are labels to describe the tactical formation that a team is using. A football formation acts as a positional blueprint of sorts to help each player understand where they should be and what they should do. Just as basketball has the “two-three zone” (and many others), and American football has the “3-4 defense” (and many others), real football (soccer to you American philistines) has the “4-3-3 formation” and many others.
What do the Numbers in a Formation Mean?
Each of the numbers in a formation refers to a theoretical line of players across the pitch. I say “theoretical” because, in reality, everyone on a football pitch is constantly in motion. Thus, it’s rare for players to be in a straight line, or otherwise be positioned exactly in the spots indicated by a formation map.
The numbers in a team’s formation give us some sense of where the ten “outfield” players on the pitch will be positioned for that team. The “outfield players” are everyone on the team other than the goalkeeper. The poor goalkeeper is left out of the formation altogether, because everyone knows where s/he will be.
The first number in the formation refers to the “back line” of the team, also known as the defense. For example, in a 4-3-3 formation such as the one that Liverpool usually employs, the number four refers to these four players: the left back (a/k/a left “fullback”), the two center backs, and the right back (a/k/a right “fullback”), as shown below. By the way, the dots below are labeled with numbers, which in this Part will correspond with the kit (that’s “jersey” to us American philistines) number worn by Liverpool’s usual starters in those positions. In these examples, Liverpool will be shown attacking the goal on the right side, and defending the goal on the left.
Similarly, the middle number(s) in the formation name refers to the “midfield” line(s). In the example of the 4-3-3, although there’s only one midfield number, we nonetheless typically envision the three midfielders as being set up in a triangle, rather than a straight line. Also, you may notice that the midfielder positioned in the middle of the picture below is labeled “defensive midfielder,” while the two players positioned ahead of him to the left and the right are both labeled as “central midfielder.” I know this is confusing. Why not call the two players closer to the sidelines “wide midfielders”? Sigh. If only it were that easy. All three of these players in a 4-3-3 can be called “central midfielders.” Sometimes you will see the middle player referred to as a “central defensive midfielder.” Other formations, such as the 4-2-3-1, use “wide midfielders,” but we don’t usually use that label with respect to players in a 4-3-3.
Finally, as you’ve guessed by now, the last number(s) in the formation refers to the attacking line(s), as shown below. This attacking line may be visualized as a straight line, as a triangle with the middle attacker seen in a more advanced position, or a triangle with the middle attacker playing farther back from the two attackers on either side. In our example, we will position the players in a straight line for now, and we will label the three positions in this line as wide forward, center forward, and wide forward. More about the positions and the many names/labels associated with them in a bit.
If we visualize all 11 Liverpool players in their 4-3-3 formation, it will look like this:
There are dozens of variations of formations, but only a handful of them are commonly employed today. These are: 1) the 4-3-3; 2) the 4-2-3-1; 3) the 4-4-2; 4) the 4-4-2 with a diamond midfield (a/k/a the 4-1-2-1-2); 5) the 3-4-3; and 6) the 3-5-2.
The first four formations listed above all start with the number four, so we know that the defensive “back line” in those formations is composed of four players: 1) left back; 2) center back (left); 3) center back (right); and 4) right back. But, if you look at the last two formations listed, the 3-4-3 and the 3-5-2, they both start with the number “3.” Thus, both of those formations use a theoretical defensive back line consisting of three players instead of four: 1) center back (left); 2) center back (middle); and 3) center back (right). To make matters even more confusing, these formations that begin with the number three also bring with them a new label for two widely-positioned defensive players we previously referred to as “left back” and “right back” in the other formations. In the “three-at-the-back” formations, these two players are now called “wingbacks” instead of “fullbacks.” The wingbacks are now included as part of the midfield instead of the defensive line. Below is an example using a 3-4-3 formation to illustrate.
The other commonly-seen modern formations are shown below.
To sum up, the numbers in a formation’s name refer, in order, to the defensive line, the midfield line(s), and then the attacking line(s).
Please note that these formations provide a very theoretical and approximate guide for where you might find players on the pitch during an actual match. As noted above, everybody is in constant motion. Critically, when a team is in possession, the formations can be thrown out the window, because when a team attacks in modern football, many of the so-called defenders and midfielders will advance into positions where they are positioned near, even with, or even ahead of the so-called forwards. More on this later, along with some visualizations of how a formation might change shape when a team is attacking.
What Are the Positions on a Football Team?
The nomenclature around football positions is wildly confusing to a newbie (and sometimes confusing to people who have been watching and studying football for years). Football coaches and commentators can and will refer to positional roles on a football team using several different names and labels that may all actually refer to an identical or nearly-identical positional role.
I will try to cut through some of this confusion by giving you the names that are most commonly used in the modern game to refer to particular positions. These are the names you should try to learn and remember. Then, at the end of my description of that positional role, I will also give you some OTHER names for that position that you will sometimes hear. You don’t need to learn these, but knowing that they are out there may help lessen your confusion if and when you hear those alternative labels. Some of these alternative labels actually suggest nuanced differences in the positional role, compared to the more common label. But there’s no need for you to try to learn that stuff now (and probably not ever, unless you become a football tactics nerd).
I will provide the positional roles and names starting from the back (the defense), and working my way to the midfielders, and finally the attackers.
Goalkeeper
The main job is simple enough – the goalkeeper is there to stop shots. But, in modern football, keepers also play an important role in helping the outfield players maintain possession, and in starting transitions from defense to attack. Alternative names for the position: goalie, keeper, #1.
Fullbacks (Right Back and Left Back):
These are the wide players in the defensive back line in a formation that begins with the number “4.” However, although they are nominally defensive players, they are called “fullbacks” because they are also expected to join in the attack when their team has the ball. Thus, fullbacks have responsibility for the “full” pitch (that’s “field” to us American philistines). Fullbacks routinely will find themselves in very advanced positions. Indeed, when joining the attack fullbacks may often go all the way up the pitch within a few yards of the opposition’s goal line, especially when the fullback has the ball and is looking to provide a pass into the center of the penalty box. This type of pass from a wide position into the center of the box is called a “cross.” In the U.S. you will also hear the term “centering pass” used. Fullbacks are typically quite fast, because they need to defend against wide attackers, who often are the fastest players on the pitch. Fullbacks are usually very good dribblers and passers, especially with their strong foot. Right backs are usually right-footed, and left backs normally left-footed. Alternative names for the position: wingback (only applies when their team is set up in a formation that begins with a “3”). NOTE: Because fullbacks/wingbacks are positioned very wide – on the “wings” of the team – it’s easy to get this position confused with “wingers,” who are attackers. But, even though fullbacks do play on the wing, we don’t call them “wingers.” Yes, in a “three-at-the-back” formation they are called “wingbacks,” but that’s different. You can call me Ray, or you can call me Jay, but you doesn’t have to call me a wingback (and, there’s a pop culture reference for the kids, who grew up like me in the 1970s).
Center Backs
These are the players at the heart of the defense. Typically, these guys are the biggest and strongest outfield players. Their main job is to anticipate danger and then position themselves in a spot to stop that danger from coming about. They also need to keep close track of the opposition’s forwards and attackers, and they need to “clear” balls that are sent into the penalty box, whether in the air or on the ground. Traditionally, center backs play a very small role when their team has the ball. They typically come forward into the opposition penalty box when their team is taking a corner kick, because they are expected to be able to use their size and strength to win headers. However, they usually otherwise stay in their own defensive half, even when their team has the ball. Center backs are not traditionally known for being good dribblers or passers.
Having said all of that, the best and most aggressive teams in modern football make extensive use of their center backs while in possession. Liverpool’s center backs, for example, are all outstanding with the ball at their feet, and their passing and dribbling skills are very important tools for the team’s attack. Center backs on these teams also tend to push much higher up the pitch toward the attacking end when their team has possession. Alternative names for the position: center-half (this is the old label that signified that these players’ duties were limited to the defensive half of the pitch).
Defensive Midfielder
Depending on the formation being used, a team will typically employ either one or two players who can be described as “defensive midfielders.” In Liverpool’s typical 4-3-3 formation, they use a single defensive midfielder, also known as a “single pivot,” because the defensive midfielder provides the link that pivots between the defenders and the attackers. Likewise, in formations that use two defensive midfielders, such as the 4-2-3-1, those two DMs are sometimes collectively called a “double pivot.”
The defensive midfielder has two primary jobs. First, the player must shield the back line, especially by breaking up counterattacks (that’s “fast breaks” to us philistine Americans who grew up watching basketball). In this role, defensive midfielders block passing lanes, intercept, and “tackle” players as they dribble or receive a pass. In real football, by contrast to our American football, a “tackle” is an attempt to kick the ball away from an attacker and dispossess them.
The defensive midfielder’s job of shielding the defense is sometimes referred to as “destroying.” Among current Premier League midfielders, Chelsea’s N’Golo Kante is probably the paradigm of a “destroyer.” Kante flits all over the pitch, breaking up the opposition’s attack in a variety of ways, coming from a variety of positions and a variety of angles. Liverpool’s Fabinho also excels at this job.
In addition to “destroying,” the defensive midfielder must also facilitate his own team’s attack. This is often described as “playmaking,” similar to a point guard’s role on the basketball floor. However, unlike a point guard, a defensive midfielder is usually not the one providing the assist – that is, the last pass before an attacker scores. Certainly defensive midfielders can and do get assists, but when they are acting as playmakers they are more routinely making the so-called “pass before the pass.” In this context, these players are sometimes called “deep-lying playmakers.” “Deep-lying” refers to their physical location – players are “sitting deep” when they are far from the opposition goal.
Defensive midfielders in their playmaking capacity keep the team’s tempo, they constantly make themselves available for a return pass, and they try to find their own players in open spaces. For Liverpool, Thiago Alcântara is a masterful deep-lying playmaker – indeed, throughout his career he has been known as among the best in the world at this role. Although Thiago is typically not positioned as the defensive midfielder in Liverpool’s 4-3-3 (that’s usually either Fabinho or Jordan Henderson), he nonetheless tends to stay in a relatively deep-lying position on the left side of the midfield, from which he can direct traffic and find his teammates in space. Alternative names for the position: holding midfielder, destroyer, deep-lying playmaker, regista, single pivot, double pivot.
Central Midfielder
A defensive midfielder is a sub-category of central midfielder. Often, however, when the term “central midfielder” or “center mid” is used without further embellishment, the speaker is referring to midfielders who are playing a slightly more advanced role than defensive midfielders. These more advanced midfielders may have a so-called box-to-box role. That is, they may have responsibility both for dropping back all the way to the edge of their own penalty box to defend, and also for advancing all the way to the opponent’s penalty box when attacking. For Liverpool, Jordan Henderson typically plays this “box-to-box” role when he’s playing ahead of Fabinho (although when Henderson is playing without Fabinho in the lineup, Henderson usually takes Fabinho’s spot as the defensive midfielder).
In a diamond-shaped midfield, as used in the 4-diamond-2 formation (a/k/a the 4-1-2-1-2), there are two central midfielders who are positioned in the slightly wider area between the defensive mid at the base of the diamond and the attacking mid at the point of the diamond. These two slightly-wider central midfielders in a diamond formation are often called the “shuttlers,” because their job is to shuttle the ball between defense and attack. Alternative names for the position: box-to-box midfielder, shuttler, mezzala.
Wide Midfielder
Formations such as the 4-2-3-1 and 4-4-2 employ wide midfielders. Sometimes these wide midfielders play like a traditional central midfielder who is merely positioned out wide – that is, they generally stay in the middle third of the pitch, and they facilitate play and link the defense and attack. However, especially in the 4-2-3-1 formation, wide midfielders will often have a more attacking role, and will play as much like a forward as a midfielder. Wide attacking midfielders often have the job of dribbling toward the center of the pitch from wide areas. If they can dribble past a defender, this will open up space and provide opportunities for creating shot-making chances (opportunities to shoot are often simply referred to as “chances”). Alternative names for the position: winger, #7, #11.
Attacking midfielder
The 4-2-3-1, which is among the most popular formations in modern football, uses two wide attacking midfielders and a central attacking mid. All attacking midfielders, as their title suggests, act as hybrids between forwards and midfielders. Attacking mids often make forward-like runs behind the defense, but they will also receive the ball “in between the lines” of midfield and attack, then turn to try to link with their forwards. Attacking midfielders play the advanced playmaker role that corresponds with the deep-lying playmaker role of the defensive midfielder. Unlike defensive midfielders, however, attacking midfielders are expected to generate quite a few assists. Alternative names for the position: #10 (specifically refers to the central attacking midfielder), advanced playmaker, trequartista, fantasista.
Wide Forward
In the 4-3-3 formation, the two wide players in the attacking line are often called “wide forwards.” They are equally likely to be called “wingers.” In modern football, the wide forwards in a 4-3-3 are often also described as “inverted wingers.” This sounds like some type of aerospace technology, but it’s not that complex. The “inverted” aspect of the label actually refers to the fact that an “inverted winger” is one who is positioned on the opposite side of the pitch from their strong foot. So, if you’re a right-footed forward who plays on the left side of the pitch – like Sadio Mané or Luís Díaz, you’re an inverted winger. In the same way, you’re also an inverted winger if you are left-footed and play on the right side of the pitch, like Mohamed Salah.
Strangely (at least to me), wide forwards are also sometimes called “inside forwards,” which strikes me as a counter-intuitive label for a player in a wide position. In this context, “inside” refers to the fact that players in this position are expected to cut inside toward the center of the box from their starting wide position.
Wide forwards are expected both to provide assists and score goals. Liverpool’s wide forwards tend to do both of those things quite a lot. Alternative names for the position: winger, inverted winger, inside forward.
Center Forward
Every commonly-employed modern football formation uses at least one center forward, who is equally-likely to be called a “striker.” Typically, the center forward is the main goal-scoring threat in the team. In addition to scoring goals, center forwards are responsible for providing the team an outlet when their team regains possession in the defensive half. In this context, center forwards typically hang out near the midfield line, waiting for a pass or a defensive clearance to come their way. Strikers should then use their body to shield off the defense, similar to a basketball player posting up a defender. Once a forward takes control of the ball, s/he should then keep possession long enough to permit teammates to join the attack. This process is often referred to as “hold-up play.”
A striker is often referred to as a “number 9.” Over the last 15 years or so, many teams have chosen to have their striker play a so-called “false nine” role, which is a bit different than the more traditional job of a striker. A “false nine” plays more like a central attacking midfielder than a traditional center forward. The false nine will drop deeper, often functioning as an extra midfielder, and will link up play with other attackers. The false nine is typically more of a facilitator and playmaker than a scorer. For Liverpool, Roberto Firmino usually plays as a “false nine.” Alternative names for this position: striker, #9, “false nine.”
How Formations Change When a Team Advances in Possession
When teams are sitting back in defense, the shape of the team will usually roughly correspond with the formation they are playing. However, even that’s not always the case. “Three-at-the-back” formations, such as the 3-5-2, usually become “five-at-the-back” when the team has been pushed back in defense. In that defensive situation, the three center backs are joined by the two wingbacks in the back line, thus creating a five-man back line.
Regardless of the formation, when teams regain possession and move up the pitch to attack, their shape quickly changes. We still talk about the team as playing in a 4-3-3 or a 3-5-2, but the actual shape of the team will usually look quite different.
For example, in Liverpool’s 4-3-3 formation, when LFC are in possession the fullbacks (that’s the left back and the right back) will join the attack. Depending on how far the team has progressed up the pitch (sometimes referred to as the “phase of play”), the fullbacks might be in the midfield line or even the forward line. Because the fullbacks have left their defensive roles for the moment, the shape of the team can no longer fairly be described as a 4-3-3. To be clear, we do still call it a 4-3-3, but 4-3-3 has stopped being an accurate description. Let’s look at an example, when Liverpool have regained possession but have only progressed the ball into the midfield – they have not yet made it into the final, attacking third of the pitch. The players’ positions will probably look something like this:
As you can see, the two center backs are alone in the back line, unless you count Fabinho (the defensive midfielder) as being with them. I think, if we were trying to give this shape a formation name, it would be more accurate to give Fabinho his own line. So, what would this formation be called, if we were to name it? Remember, the keeper doesn’t count for purposes of the formation. So, we’d start with van Dijk and Matip. Our first number is a 2. The next line has only Fabinho. Now we’ve got 2-1.
The next line is where it gets really interesting. At this point, from left to right, Robertson, Díaz, Thiago, Firmino, Henderson, and Alexander-Arnold are all compressed in a pretty tight strip across the pitch. We could split them into two lines of three, but I think it’s fair to call this one line of six. And then Salah is by himself in a more advanced position.
Thus, above we’ve got a shape that looks far more like a 2-1-6-1 (or perhaps a 2-1-3-3-1) than it does a 4-3-3.
Now, let’s see what might happen when Liverpool advance even farther up in attack.
Now, Robertson has advanced on the left sideline all the way past Díaz and into an area even with the opponent’s penalty box. He also has the ball. The center backs and Fabinho have both pushed much higher up the pitch as well. Meanwhile, there are six attackers in or around the top of the opponent’s penalty area. At this point the shape might be called 2-2-6, or 2-2-4-2.
My point here is not to try to explain Liverpool’s attacking patterns, which would be a much longer conversation. I’m just trying to illustrate that you should NOT expect the shape described by a formation’s name to make much sense when that team is attacking.
Enough about formations and positions. Let’s get to the good stuff.
Tactical Styles
Regardless of formation, the most important tactical decision any manager makes is what overall style his or her team will employ. Football teams play with wildly varying tactical styles, which is what allows English Premier League matches to be competitive, even when they pit the big boys against relatively tiny opponents. Because there is no salary cap in football, the salaries (or, as Brits would say, “wages”) paid by the rich clubs dwarf the money paid to players at smaller clubs. According to spotrac.com, in 2022-23, Manchester United pays the most salary of any team, coming in at an estimated £202.8 million. That salary total presents a crazy contrast with the smallest estimated salary total in the league, Brentford F.C., which is only £16. 6 million. In other words, the highest “wage bill” in the league is more than 12 times higher than the smallest.
Over the course of a 38-game season, the money usually wins out (although Manchester United have struggled to reach the top in recent seasons in spite of their huge spending). In other words, the little guys have very little chance of winning the Premier League (but – ask Leicester City – “very little chance” is not the same as “no chance”).
But in any given match, despite the huge disparities in money – and therefore in talent – any team in the Premier League is capable of winning or drawing a match against any other team. In part this is due to the types of variability and uncertainty that make us watch any sport – sometimes athletes perform above their normal skill level in a particular match. Sometimes the ball bounces in exactly the right way. Sometimes the playing conditions level out differences in talent. But, in my opinion, as much or more than any of those factors, tactics plays a huge role in closing the gap between two teams with widely disparate talent levels.
Parking the Bus vs. Pressing, Possession, and Control
At its most basic level, the playing styles employed by the big teams and the little teams are fairly simple and consistent. In general, the smaller clubs cram as many defenders as possible in and around their own penalty area, giving their opponent very little space in which to attack. In the parlance of football, they “park the bus” in front of their own goal to block their opponents from scoring. Think of it like a very tight zone defense in basketball.
By contrast, in general the rich clubs play very aggressively. When they don’t have the ball, they tend to press their opponent all over the pitch in an effort to get it right back. Then, when they do have the ball (which is almost the whole time against the smaller clubs), they pass it creatively and skillfully all over the pitch, forcing their opponent to shift their defense as the ball moves from one area of the pitch to the other. Then, when the defense has been sufficiently stretched, the rich teams search out an opening somewhere in the penalty area. They’re looking for just enough space to find an attacker with time to get off a shot. Often this space gets created by very quick combinations of short passing. The first passer cuts toward the goal, and then receives an immediate return pass (what we call the “give-and-go” in basketball – here they are called “one-twos”).
The control and skill required to stretch the defense and execute these intricate passing combinations is unbelievable. Even though the defenders may be getting paid as little as one-tenth as much as the attackers, they are still very talented professional footballers. They know exactly what’s coming, and they are typically very practiced at maintaining their positional discipline and blocking the path of their more gifted opponents.
When the little guys finally manage to get the ball, they often launch it a long way forward, hoping that one of their attackers can gain control of it and find a quick opportunity to shoot. Critics might derisively label this offensive approach “Route One” football, because the long passes and clearances are low-percentage plays. One might think that such long balls reflect more hope than plan.
However, the strategy is in fact quite smart. Often, by the time the underdogs have gotten possession, their opponents have pushed all (or almost all) of their outfield players into the opposition half. When the underdogs send a long ball into their opponent’s half, they stand a decent chance of catching those opponents short on defenders.
This clash of styles has occurred for decades. Both approaches are tried and true. The balance is tight. Over time, skill (and therefore money) will eventually win the day. But across a mere 90 minutes, anything goes.
Gegenpressing – the Liverpool Way
As one of the Big Boys of the Premier League, Liverpool’s tactical style broadly fits the approach I described above. But there are certainly gradations and variations within that broad approach. Liverpool – like all of Klopp’s teams – are well-known for playing with higher intensity than their opponents, regardless of who those opponents are. Klopp pushes his team very, very hard in the preseason, seeking to bring them to higher levels of fitness than any team in the league.
Then, once the games begin, Klopp expects his team to work harder and more intensely than everyone else.
This week, Klopp’s lead assistant, Pep Ljinders, released a new book about his time at Liverpool. Fittingly, the title is Intensity. Klopp gives Ljinders primary responsibility for designing and running training sessions (that’s “practice” to us philistine Americans). Ljinders has long said about Liverpool that “our identity is intensity.”
When Liverpool loses the ball, they immediately work as a unit to get the ball back as quickly as possible. To help them do this, they push their defensive line very high up the pitch, so that there is very little space between Liverpool’s defenders and their attackers.
Compressing this space between its own lines, gives Liverpool greater numbers in the opponent’s half, which allows them to strangle the opponent’s time and space on the ball when they get it. Players who have just recovered the ball are vulnerable to losing it, because they may still be getting the ball under control, and they have not yet had time to assess the relative positions of their teammates and opponents, so that they can find the right pass. This approach of attempting to win the ball back is often described as “gegenpressing,” which is a German word for “counter-pressing.” For a great three-and-a-half minute explanation and illustration of gegenpressing, watch this video.
Playing such a high defensive line intentionally leaves the opponent space in only one place – behind the Liverpool defense and in front of Liverpool’s goal. Obviously, this tactic creates a high risk that opponents will send a “through ball” to a player who runs behind the defense. If the “through ball” is successful, the attacker who receives the pass will be one-on-one with the goalkeeper (also known as being “through on goal”).
However, the risk that the opponent will get behind the defense is probably not as dire as you might expect, if you play the high defensive line as effectively as Liverpool does.
First, Liverpool press so effectively when they lose the ball, that their opponents have very little time or space to pass the ball. And, generally speaking, a “through pass” requires perfect timing and touch. Pass the ball too hard and the goalkeeper will be able to come get it. Pass it too softly and a defender will intercept it. Because Liverpool is probably all over you whenever you get the ball, effectively making such a delicate pass becomes very difficult.
Second, the timing of the run of the would-be recipient of the through pass must be close to perfect, or the player will be offside and Liverpool will get the ball back. I’m not going to explain the offside rule here, but if you’re not certain you understand it, you should stop right now and watch this video that explains offside in less than two minutes.
Third, Liverpool’s goalkeeper, Alisson Becker, is exceptionally quick off his line. This allows him to reach many through passes before the attacking player. Alisson’s positioning also helps him save shots when an attacker gets a one-on-one chance against him. In those situations, Alisson typically charges out at the attacker and cuts off his shooting angles. Alisson’s record for making saves in those difficult situations is quite good.
When Liverpool’s pressing is successful and they get the ball back, they typically try to score as quickly and directly as possible. On this front, Liverpool’s tactical approach differs significantly from its primary Premier League rival – Manchester City. Both teams use the counter-press extensively, seeking to regain the ball as soon as they lose it. But when Man City wins the ball, unlike Liverpool, they are typically quite patient with it. City look to pass teams to death, moving the defenders all over the pitch before finally cutting them open. With Man City, it’s death by a thousand cuts.
Liverpool, by contrast, want to bludgeon a team as quickly and directly as possible. As Klopp himself describes, “gegenpressing is the best playmaker. … no playmaker in the world can be as good as a good counter-pressing situation.” Because a counter-press will often lead to recovering the ball very high up the pitch, Liverpool can exploit the opportunity to score after only one or two passes (or, occasionally, no passes at all).
LFC’s Recipe for Success in Possession: Pushing the Ball to the Fullbacks Out Wide
Of course, because many teams will park the bus against Liverpool, the Reds usually have a lot of possession. You can’t press when you already have the ball. Thus, Liverpool needed to develop ways to score without the benefit of the counter-press.
To a large extent, Klopp built Liverpool’s attack around their two fullbacks. Rather than driving the ball through the middle of the pitch where there is typically less space, Liverpool usually funnels the ball out wide, where the fullbacks exchange passes with midfielders, the wide forwards, and Roberto Firmino.
Because defenses typically allow more space out wide, Liverpool’s fullbacks have more time to pass effectively. Both Andy Robertson and Trent Alexander-Arnold are excellent passers, and their crossing (that is, passing from out wide toward the center of the penalty area) has worked to devastating effect. Last season, for example, Trent finished second in the Premier League for assists, and Robertson was only one assist behind him – tied for third place. Trent is only 23 years old, and he has 43 Premier League assists, which places him fourth all-time among defenders, only 10 assists behind the leader, Leighton Baines, who is now retired. Robertson currently sits second on that all-time list, with 45 assists.
This Season’s New Twist: Bringing in a More Traditional “Number 9”
This season, Liverpool’s tactical approach may take a new twist with the arrival of new signing Darwin Nuñez, who is a different type of striker to any that Klopp has used previously at Liverpool. As described above, Liverpool have often used either Roberto Firmino or Sadio Mané in a “false 9” role. In that situation, the striker has often acted as a fourth midfielder – at least as much a facilitator as a goal-scorer.
Nuñez will bring a very different style and approach. He is not going to play as a “false 9.” Instead, he is a much more traditional “number 9,” who will look to make runs behind the defense, seeking dangerous spaces in the box from which he will be in a position to score immediately. Darwin is also much bigger than Klopp’s forwards have typically been, and he is very good at scoring with his head.
Because Nuñez is very fast, and will look to run behind the defense, Liverpool should be able to stretch defenses vertically more than they have previously. By playing through the fullbacks in past years, Liverpool has effectively stretched defenses across the pitch, but not nearly so much vertically.
Now, Nuñez’s presence will force center backs to make difficult decisions about how high to push their defensive line. If the defenders sag to prevent Nuñez from getting behind them, this will leave much more open space above the box which will give Liverpool’s playmakers much more opportunity to create from the center of the pitch. If, on the other hand, the defense pushes the line higher, Nuñez will have more space available to run behind.
Darwin’s natural movement should also leave him in great spots in which to pick up the types of “poacher’s goals” that Diogo Jota has often scored. Both Nuñez and Jota are masters of finding space in what appears to be a crowded penalty area.
I am excited that Nuñez’s presence will mean that Liverpool have more varied ways in which to create opportunities and score goals. Klopp has said that, as great as Liverpool’s season was last year, they became too predictable, which Real Madrid manager Carlo Ancelotti pointed out after they defeated the Reds in the Champions League Final. With Nuñez as an option, Liverpool’s tactics and approach should be far less predictable for the opposition.
A Few Words about Some Advanced Stats
I’m a stats nerd. I believe in the power of data. Thus, when I write about football, I will often refer to particular statistics that I believe demonstrate how well a team has performed – in a particular match, and especially over a group of matches.
To me, “expected goals” is a very powerful statistical concept that is relatively easy to understand, once it is explained to you. As I wrote here, Expected goals (or xG) measures the quality of a chance by calculating the likelihood that it will be scored from a particular position on the pitch during a particular phase of play. This value is based on several factors from before the shot was taken. xG is measured on a scale between zero and one, where zero represents a chance that is impossible to score and one represents a chance that a player would be expected to score every single time.
Thus, looking at xG gives us a better idea of which team created the best opportunities to score in a match, compared with looking at the actual result. As football fans are often painfully reminded, the scoring of actual goals involves a ton of statistical variance. Put differently, there’s lots and lots of skill involved, but with respect to any given shot, there’s also quite a bit of luck. If you want more explanation about xG, watch this four-minute video.
Sometimes, if you’re evaluating attacking players, it’s important to know not only the quality of the chances that they have had (which xG provides), but it’s also important to know how many of those chances came about as the result of penalty kicks. If an attacker happens to be the penalty taker in the team, that can substantially (and somewhat artificially) boost his or her xG statistics. For that reason, I may sometimes refer to a player’s “non-penalty expected goals,” or “npxG.”
The expected goals concept can also be used to evaluate a team’s defense, simply by looking at their “expected goals allowed,” or “xGa.” Thus, for any particular game or block of games, a team’s overall performance can be assessed by their expected goal differential – that is, how many expected goals have they generated, minus the number of expected goals they have allowed? Back in the day, goal differential was a crudely effective method for evaluating a team’s performance over time. Now, xG differential provides a much more refined way to do the same thing.
Finally, I will also sometimes refer to the number of “big chances” or “clear-cut chances.” Opta, which provides official statistics for the Premier League, defines a “clear-cut chance” as “a situation where a player should reasonably be expected to score – usually in a one-on-one scenario or from very close range.” Statisticians actually keep track of these big scoring chances, using this relatively objective definition. Because these types of chances typically result in a fairly high percentage of a team’s goals, keeping separate track of their creation provides a powerful indicator of how effective a team’s attack has been over a particular period.
Well, if you made it this far, you may have the makings of a tactics and/or stats nerd. Wear it proudly!
See you next time for the breakdown of Liverpool’s current players, along with a Season Preview. In the meantime, cheer on those Reds tomorrow against Fulham!
