Eleven points. It’s only October 8, and Arsenal’s lead over Liverpool is ELEVEN POINTS.
After last weekend’s ugly 3-3 draw against Brighton, it felt as if Liverpool’s title hopes were gone. But mid-week brought us a clean sheet, a decent LFC performance, and a new set of tactics in the Champions League. So we the fans now look ahead to the next two Premier League matches against league leaders Arsenal and the apparently invincible Manchester City. A familiar excitement begins to grow at the possibilities. But that tinge of excitement masks an alien undercurrent of dread — a fear that we will sit in frozen panic on our couches as the Reds get carved open again and again by the best teams in the league.
The Reds season sits on the brink. And we sit there with them, knowing that Arsenal and Manchester City stand ready to shove us over the edge, where we will be buried in an avalanche of despair, alongside Liverpool’s season hopes.
How will it tip?
Should LFC Be Using Only Two Central Midfielders?
As a tactics nerd, I’m captivated by the possibilities that new tactical systems might bring. Against Rangers, Klopp pulled a surprise by naming four forwards in the starting lineup, while naming only two central midfielders. Is the new 4-2-4 formation the magic bullet? Will Klopp stick with it against the biggest and baddest teams in the land? And if the system does provide a potential fix, why is that?
One intriguing aspect of the 4-2-4 for the Reds is that the formation uses only two central midfielders. And that might be a really good idea.
Most observers and fans believe that Liverpool’s midfield has been broken this season. Different people have very different beliefs about why the midfield has failed to function. One can point to a lot of culprits. The blame lies with some combination of injuries, fatigue, age, bad attitude, and management’s decision not to invest in the transfer market.
The Intense Demands of Klopp’s 4-3-3 on Liverpool’s Midfielders
Klopp’s 4-3-3 demands a lot from its midfielders. The midfielders must simultaneously serve as the central core of Liverpool’s vaunted press, the wide cover for two marauding fullbacks, and the tempo-setters for a team that generally dominates possession. Especially out of possession, Klopp’s system requires the midfielders to know precisely when to push forward and when to retreat. The midfielders provide the key cover in transition. They are the foundation that allows Liverpool’s aggressive attack to flourish.
Each of Klopp’s three midfielders in the 4-3-3 plays a quite different role, although they also must interchange positions and responsibilities throughout the match. The defensive midfielder provides the anchor, covering the entire center of the pitch. The DM shields LFC’s high defensive line, both by dropping deep to play as a third center back, and by surging forward to harass and tackle in the press.
Klopp’s left-sided “8” (vocabulary note: the two more-advanced central midfielders in the 4-3-3 system are best described as “eights,” who have box-to-box responsibilities. The 4-3-3 formation does not use true “attacking midfielders,” whose responsibilities primarily focus on the attacking half of the pitch) acts as the deep-lying playmaker. When the Reds have the ball, the left-sided 8 must keep possession and tempo, looking to work the ball around until the defense finally leaves a gap that creates a scoring opportunity.
The right-sided “8” is the most-advanced midfielder, and the only one of the three who might accurately be described as an attacker. In possession he must look to create chances through quick passing combinations with the right-sided forward, the right back, and the center forward. He must quickly react and respond to his teammates’ movements, filling the empty space across the attacking third of the pitch to stretch the defense.
Out of possession, both of the “8s” provide the primary cover for Liverpool’s attacking fullbacks. This is true even of the right-sided “8,” despite his attacking responsibilities. When Liverpool marches up the pitch in possession, eventually both fullbacks will end up in highly-advanced positions. Once the Reds eventually lose the ball, the two eights must fill in for the fullbacks by guarding Liverpool’s defensive wings.
In other words, Klopp’s midfielders in the 4-3-3 must master not only traditional midfield roles, but also be capable of playing as center backs or full backs in a variety of situations. The midfielders’ decisions and positioning are key to the overall balance of the team. If they all get it right, Liverpool flourishes. When one or more of them gets it wrong, Liverpool’s defense can be carved open.
Using Only Two Central Midfielders Actually Simplifies Their Task
Intriguingly, by moving to a so-called “double pivot,” — that is, by using only two central midfielders — Jürgen Klopp is probably simplifying the roles of his midfielders, if not making them any easier.
When playing without a third central midfielder to provide defensive cover in transition, it’s critical that the two members of a “double-pivot” stay fairly deep when the Reds have the ball. If either of those midfielders creeps too far forward, then the two center backs and the other midfielder will be forced to cover too much space across the pitch when the opposition launches a counter-attack. But when the the two midfielders stay at home, once the Reds do lose the ball, they will both be well-positioned to press or drop to cover a fullback spot.
With these more limited positional responsibilities, the two central midfielders have fewer difficult decisions to make. When the Reds have the ball, they need to stay involved, but without pushing too far forward. When the Reds lose the ball, they still need to decide whether to press or drop, but they are making that decision from a far-better position to defend than they often find themselves in when playing in the 4-3-3.
The Other Tactical Twist – Leaving Trent Alexander-Arnold In a Deeper Position
Klopp added an additional tactical twist on Tuesday by using Trent Alexander-Arnold as a deep-lying playmaker when the Reds had the ball. Traditionally, when the Reds advance methodically up the pitch, Trent moves all the way into the attacking third, right alongside Mo Salah. And, to be sure, even on Tuesday, Trent occasionally pushed all the way up into that highly-advanced spot. But he did so far less frequently than he usually does.
On Tuesday, even when Liverpool kept the ball and moved slowly up the pitch into the attacking third, Trent stayed mostly even with or behind Liverpool’s midfielders, typically 35 yards or more away from the opposition goal. From there, Trent acted as a deep-lying playmaker — effectively like a third central midfielder to keep tempo and possession, and also find teammates in space. This position makes excellent use of Trent’s incredible vision and passing skills. But the primary tactical benefit of playing Alexander-Arnold in this more-withdrawn spot is that it leaves him in far better position to fill his defensive responsibilities when the Reds lose the ball. With Trent in this spot, no covering midfielder is needed on the right side, because Trent can handle those defensive responsibilities himself.
Klopp’s New 4-2-4 Formation Is Actually More Conservative Than His 4-3-3
Despite using four out-and-out forwards against Rangers, Klopp’s tactics were actually more conservative and defensively-oriented than his usual 4-3-3 system.
Klopp directed Trent Alexander-Arnold, Thiago, and Henderson to stay deeper when the Reds are attacking, leaving each of them in better positions to stop counter-attacks when the Reds lose possession. But, each of those three still played a critical role for the Reds in attack, by moving the ball, maintaining tempo, and finding the attacking line in space.
In Klopp’s usual 4-3-3 system, in attack the formation eventually becomes a 2-2-6. Once the Reds have moved slowly up the pitch into the attacking third, the typical positions of the team in the 4-3-3 system will look like this:
By contrast, in the 4-2-4 system Klopp employed against Rangers, in attack the Reds employed more of a 2-3-5 approach that looked like this:
In other words, the 4-2-4 system leaves one extra player high up the pitch, in an ideal position to help stop a counter-attack.
The Forwards in the 4-2-4 Share Midfield Responsibilities
Meanwhile, against Rangers the four forwards themselves dropped into midfield early and often. When the ball came up the left side, left-sided forward Díaz and one of the two central strikers (Jota or Núñez) would drop into midfield, creating passing triangles to permit the Reds to maintain the possession and move up the pitch. Conversely, when the ball went up the right, Mo Salah would join with one of the two strikers to act as auxiliary midfielders. This still left one of the two strikers and the wide forward on the other side to stretch the pitch vertically. While their two mates dropped into midfield, the other two forwards stood ready to receive a pass to feet on the edge of the box, or a long diagonal, cross, or through pass in or around the box.
Playing Only Two Central Midfielders Potentially Makes Better Use of Liverpool’s Available Talent
As we discussed at the outset, Liverpool’s midfield this season has not functioned up to par. Thiago, Henderson, Curtis Jones, and Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain have all missed significant time due to injuries. Naby Keïta has allegedly suffered an injury, but in reality may be a completely lost cause after throwing a fit about his lack of playing time. And James Milner is old.
On top of these injuries, Fabinho has performed as a shadow of his normally-dominant self. He has appeared slow, lethargic, and indecisive. Indeed, during the Brighton match the manager publicly screamed at his star defensive midfielder for an extended period, clearly frustrated by Fabinho’s apparent lack of effort. Some observers thought this was the most intense public upbraiding that Klopp has ever delivered toward a Liverpool player. Klopp then benched Fabinho against Rangers. Then, when Fabinho made an appearance late in the Rangers match and the team reverted to the 4-3-3, Rangers finally managed to create a few scoring chances — something they had been unable to do the entire game up to that point.
As noted above, Klopp’s 4-3-3 system requires specialists in every midfield position. But Liverpool’s available midfield pool at the moment does not provide adequate cover for each of those three specialist positions. Among the senior players, only Fabinho and Henderson play the defensive midfield position. But both Fabinho and Henderson are injury-prone, and both are getting older and slower. Their only current backup in that position is Stefan Bajcetic, who is all of 17 years old.
The clear starter in the left-sided “8” position in the 4-3-3 is Thiago. Like Henderson and Fabinho, Thiago is also quite injury-prone. Last season, Klopp kept Thiago relatively healthy by platooning him in that position with Naby Keïta, who will probably not be available at all this year (or ever again).
The right-sided “8” position is equally problematic. Henderson is the default starter. Last season, Keïta and Oxlade-Chamberlain were his primary backups, and neither is available now. Harvey Elliott is growing into the position, but out of possession his defensive skills are still not quite up to the task.
By going to a 4-2-4 (or, you may prefer to call it a 4-4-2, 4-2-3-1, or 4-2-1-3), Klopp reduces both the number of central midfielders that he needs to use, and he gives them more limited responsibilities that are less specialized. While Elliott might have difficulty playing in the double pivot, Liverpool’s other central midfielders should each be able to slot into either or both sides of that double pivot relatively seamlessly. Henderson, Thiago, Fabinho, Curtis Jones, and Milner should all be able to play the double-pivot competently. Even Elliott might be okay in that position so long as Trent stays in the more withdrawn position we saw him play against Rangers. With six players to cover two relatively-interchangeable spots, rather than six players trying to fill three specialized positions, the Reds should be better off.
From a personnel standpoint, the other benefit of the 4-2-4 is that it gets more of Liverpool’s talented forwards out on the pitch. Díaz, Jota, Núñez, Salah, and Firmino are all terrific players, and they can all fit into the 4-2-4 system.
So What’s the Down Side of the New 4-2-4 System?
Does all of this mean that the 4-2-4 is the magic bullet, and we will never look back?
No.
By playing only two central midfielders, the 4-2-4 provides a far easier opportunity for the opposition to maintain possession and control by outnumbering us in the midfield. Teams like Arsenal — and especially Manchester City, like to control the match in the midfield. Indeed, Manchester City typically plays at least four players who function as central midfielders.
Even with the forwards dropping into midfield to help out, the Reds are unlikely to be able to maintain possession for lengthy periods when using only two central midfielders against three or four being employed by the opposition. I think it’s unlikely that Klopp will want to cede midfield dominance to these types of teams.
Also, although it’s fun and exciting for the Reds to put four forwards on the pitch from the outset, that leaves the Reds with far less flexibility and fewer choices for changing the match in the second half with substitutes.
Thus, I expect that over the next two Sundays, we will see a starting lineup configured in Klopp’s traditional 4-3-3 shape. But, Klopp may, and probably will, make certain adjustments to that 4-3-3 in ways that resemble the tactical tweaks he employed against Rangers.
How Might the 4-3-3 Change From Here?
First, I expect that both the defensive midfielder and the left-sided number eight will be asked to stay deeper when Liverpool is in possession, compared to what they have done so far this season. In other words, I think those two players will act like the double pivot acted against Rangers on Tuesday.
Second, I expect that, even in the 4-3-3, Trent will also stay in the deeper role that he played on Tuesday. Although keeping Trent in a deep position arguably robs Liverpool of an important attacker, I think the pros far outweigh the cons. Even with the Reds in possession, keeping Trent deeper arguably makes better use of his attacking skills, and gives the likes of Mo Salah and Harvey Elliott (or Salah and Henderson) more room to operate. But, when the Reds lose the ball, the benefits of keeping Trent deeper are obvious. There’s no reason he couldn’t or shouldn’t do this when the Reds set up in the 4-3-3.
Thus, from here on out I’m hoping and expecting that Liverpool will keep at least five players in relatively deep positions when they are attacking. This contrasts with having only three or four players who have stayed deep throughout much of this season. In attack, I’m hoping that our 4-3-3 will look like this from here on out, which is essentially the same shape as the 4-2-4 in attack on Tuesday, but with a midfielder in place of one of the forwards:
What Will Happen on Sunday?
Arsenal are a very good team who have been playing excellent football so far this season. Arsenal have added Manchester City expats Gabriel Jesus and Aleksander Zinchenko, along with talented center back William Saliba. All of these additions have seamlessly fit into Mikel Arteta’s team, making them both sharper in attack and more stable in defense.
Arsenal’s underlying xG performance has essentially matched its results. Arsenal are second to Manchester City in both total xG and total xG allowed. In other words, Arsenal’s attack has been better than everyone else’s, other than Manchester City. Likewise, Arsenal’s defense has also outshone everyone bar City. These numbers strongly suggest that Arsenal are for real, and have a very strong chance of breaking into the Top Four, if not challenging for the Premier League title.
Based on the season to date, there’s not that much reason to believe that Liverpool can outplay Arsenal. For all my enthusiastic ravings above about Liverpool’s 4-2-4 system, even against Rangers Liverpool failed to create many clear-cut scoring opportunities. Indeed, the team failed to score at all from open play. Out of possession, the team looked much better against Rangers, but that team is far less talented than Arsenal — or indeed, most other teams in the Premier League.
But, going back to my post before the Brighton match, there may still be a chance to reboot this season. The Reds are more rested and more healthy than they have been at virtually any point this year. They appear to have made some key tactical adjustments. I think they will compete well on Sunday.
As noted above, I expect Liverpool to start in the 4-3-3. I think the starting lineup will be much the same as it was against Rangers, except that Fabinho will start rather than Núñez. Thus, I expect:
At some point in the second half, I expect Klopp may shift to a 4-2-4 to change the game, with Núñez, Firmino, Carvalho, and Elliott all available to add attacking impetus from the bench.
I think this will be a good one, but I can’t bank on the Reds to dominate.
Arsenal 2 – LFC 2
Post-Script and Acknowledgement
I want to recognize and thank Feedspot.com for listing this site as one of the “45 Best Liverpool FC blogs and Websites.” Indeed, despite Quickly Taken Corner’s current lack of readership, Feedspot ranked it as the 18th best LFC site on the web. WooHoo! And, as always, thank YOU dear readers, for making it through yet another post that probably has too many words.
